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1 INTRODUCTION 
Broadly speaking there are two different schools of thought in macroeconom- 
ics.  Keynesian macroeconomics is based on some form of wage rigidity and 
sometimes  also  on price rigidity.  Consequently,  at least  some markets clear 
through quantity adjustment.  In the last decade a  lot of work has been done 
to explore the implications of this fundamental assumption. In what is some- 
times called disequilibrium theory rationing schemes and spillover effects from 
one market to another market have been given proper attention in static opti- 
mizing models (e.g.,  Malinvaud, 1977) as well as in dynamic optimizing models 
(e.g.,  Van de Klundert and Peters,  1986). The problem with this approach is 
that the theory is incomplete or at least partial if no justification is presented 
for wage or price rigidity. 
Sticky money wages  have been explained by different forms of wage con- 
tracts. In the theory of overlapping wage contracts (e.g., Taylor, 1979) nominal 
wages depend on wage changes that have occurred amongst other groups in 
the period since the previous wage contract and on expected prices and wages 
over the interval of the new contract. Once contracts are made they have to 
be fulfilled. To explain nominal price stickiness on the other hand one has re- 
sorted to costs of price adjustment, which may be administrative (e.g.,  Blan- 
chard  and  Kiyotaki,  1985)  or  speed-dependent  (e.g.,  Van  de  Klundert  and 
Peters, 1987). 
The second school in macroeconomics, i.e.  New Classical macroeconomic 
theory, assumes that wages and prices are fully flexible. Therefore general mar- 
ket clearing is its central analytical device. However, there may be some friction 
in the system, because people have incomplete information about all prices. If 
the general price.level increases people may mistakenly think that the price of 
their output has increased relative to other prices and consequently increase 
their production. Misperceptions can still have quantity effects after agents dis- 
cover their mistake, because there may be changes in investment too. This line 
of thought can of course be associated with the names of Lucas (1973) and Sar- 
gent (1979). 
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In  classical  and  neoclassical equilibrium  models  with  perfect competition 
market clearing prices cannot be realized without the costless coordination of 
a Walrasian auctioneer. But this is not the way things work. Actual prices are 
realized through bargaining or set unilaterally on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. A 
more realistic approach towards the problem of price setting paves the way for 
an analysis of coordination problems in trade and production. This is indeed 
the central topic of this article. Discussing some recent work on this issue, it 
will be shown that coordination failure may arise in models with externalities 
connected with imperfect competition. The theory of coordination failure is 
not intended as a  third way in macroeconomics between Keynesianism and 
New Classical Macroeconomics. On the contrary, its real aim is to provide a 
sound  microfoundation  for  Keynesian  macroeconomics.  And  according  to 
Hahn (1983) it is even the most promising one from a theoretical point of view. 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 search theory as conceived 
by Diamond (1982,  1984) is given proper attention. Coordination failure may 
arise in these models as a result of trade externalities. However, the world ac- 
cording to  Diamond  gives no proper reflection of modern industry with its 
large-scale  production. The  economic consequences  of industrialisation  are 
therefore worked out in  section  3.  Building upon the  results  of this  section 
coordination failure connected with increasing returns and imperfect competi- 
tion is  analysed in  section 4.  In  this  section the  seminal work  of Weitzman 
(1982)  occupies an  important  place.  Section 5  discusses  a  study by Drazen 
(1986) which focusses on the interactions between the labour market and the 
product market through job matching. This work may be considered supple- 
mentary to theories of coordination failure based on demand externalities. The 
article closes with some conclusions. 
2 SEARCH AND COORDINATION 
The search process has been modelled in different ways to serve different pur- 
poses. Here we shall focus on the approach chosen by Diamond (1982,  1984) 
because his work has inspired others to consider the problem of coordination 
failure in more conventional models.  Diamond  analyses search and  trade in 
markets for commodities. Search problems in the labour market will be given 
some attention in section 5,  discussing recent work by Drazen (1986) which 
deals also with demand externalities in the market for commodities. 
Modelling the trading process is a way to eliminate the Walrasian auction- 
eer. In a Walrasian setting all trade is at the equilibrium price level. All con- 
tracting comes first,  trade  follows.  In  Diamond's  economy there is  a  single 
good  which  individuals  produce  but  must  trade  before they  can consume. 
Commodity production is for inventory in the hope of a quick sale. The greater 
the stocks of inventories of others the greater the chance of finding a  trading 
partner (trading externality) and thus the greater the expected probability of 
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feedback with an externality implies the possibility of multiple equilibra and 
thus of coordination failures. It should be observed that there are no coordina- 
tion failures with multiple equilibria if they are all Pareto-optimal, as may be 
the case in a  Walrasian model (e.g.,  Diamond  1984, p.  6). With externalities 
as a cause of multiple solutions the equilibria may be Pareto-ranked. The exis- 
tence of low level activity equilibria of this type points to a coordination fail- 
ure. 
Diamond assumes that individuals face production opportunities which ar- 
rive stochastically and which have varying costs. After the decision to produce, 
based on profit maximization, agents seek trading partners, who also  arrive 
stochastically. Trade is on a  one-for-one basis  and  goods obtained are con- 
sumed, thus giving a certain utility. While Diamond uses a dynamic model of 
inventory accumulation, the essential part of his analysis can be presented in 
a static model. Following Cooper and John (1985) we assume that individuals 
face a  single production opportunity with costs expressed in terms of utility 
(disutility of labour) given by a probability distribution. There is also a given 
probability of finding a trading partner. If no trading partner is found the pro- 
duced commodity perishes. 
The strategic decision to be made by individuals is now to accept or to reject 
a given production opportunity. For this purpose it is necessary to introduce 
a  cut-off rate  of production  cost.  Only  production  possibilities  with  costs 
smaller than or equal to the cut-off value will be accepted. In this way a contin- 
uous strategy variable, i.e.  the cut-off rate of production cost, is introduced. 
Agents determine the optimal value of this variable by maximizing the expected 
utility of production and search. 
Some simple algebra may be introduced to illustrate these thoughts.  Let n 
be the expected pay-off in utility terms of engaging in production and trade. 
Production costs are denoted by ~ and the optimal cut-off value is denoted by 
x. Therefore agent i produces for ~i <  xi. The number of agents in the economy 
is equal to m. The assumption that generates the externality is that the proba- 
bility of finding a  trading partner is an increasing function of the number of 
other individuals searching for a trading partner. Consequently, the chance for 
agent i  of successful trade increases as  other agents raise their cut-off rates, 
which are symbolized by x_i. The probability of finding a  partner may then 
be given by the function f2 = f2 (x_i). Now let the constant u be the utility de- 
rived from consuming a produced good and let g(Y) be the probability density 
function associated with the distribution of production costs, then the expected 
pay-off of agent i is 
x/ 
=  ~(~u  -- 21) g(xi) dfi  (2.1)  7E  i 
~d 
O 
Individuals take the strategy variables of other agents as given when choosing 
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identical. Therefore all solutions of the implied game are symmetric Nash equi- 
libria. 
To make things more easily understandable we shall restrict the analysis to 
a special case discussed by Cooper and John (1985),  which gives rise to a con- 
tinuum of Pareto-ranked equilibria. First, suppose that the costs of production 
are uniformly distributed over the interval [O,u].  Equation (2.1)  can then be 
written as 
x  i  l  ,4 
rC  i =  (QU -- Xi) U d2i =- (2xi  2U 
o 
(2.2) 
Differentiating n i with respect to xi and putting the result equal to zero results 
in the optimal value for the cut-off rate: 
x; =  ~?u  (2.3) 
Second, suppose that trading partners meet at random after their decision to 
search is made and that an agent is able to trade if and only if the other agent 
also choose to produce. From these assumptions it follows that 
1  Xj  Xj 
Q=  _  ~--=-- 
m  lj  iu  u 
(2.4) 
Combining equations (2.3) and (2.4) we get 
xi  =g?u=x~  (2.5) 
As appears from equation (2.5) there exists a  continuum of symmetric Nash 
equilibria, which are Pareto-ranked with higher levels of x preferred and xi = u 
as a  Pareto optimum. Finally, we inspect the second-order derivatives of the 
pay-off function in equation (2.2).  Differentiating this function twice we find 
~2T~ i  ~27~  i 
--<0,  -->0  (2.6) 
~x~  ~xi~xj 
The second-order condition with respect to the strategy variable xi has the right 
sign for a  maximum. The cross derivatives are positive, which is a  necessary 
condition for multiple symmetric Nash equilibrium. The latter property of the 
pay-off function is  termed  strategic  complementarity by  Cooper  and  John 
(1985). 
What is meant by strategic complementarity can be illustrated by consider- 
ing a symmetric duopoly game. If the pay-off functions exhibit strategic com- 
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forts of the other player. The reaction functions of both players will then be 
upward sloping, which opens the door for multiple symmetric equilibria. Some 
examples are  shown in Figs.  la,  lb  and  lc.  The strategy variables of both 
players are  indicated by respectively xl  and x2.  Symmetric Nash  equilibria 
(SNE) should be located on a 45 ° ray from the origin. In Fig. la point A repre- 
sents a unique SNE, whereas there are multiple SNE in Fig. lb, indicated by 
A and B. Fig.  lc shows the case of a continuum of SNE along the line OC. 
The latter example can be seen as a two-dimensional illustration (for agents 
i and j) of the solution obtained in the model with a trading externality (i.e. 
equation (2.5)). 
Returning to search along the lines of Diamond one may wonder whether 
his theory is as realistic,  relevant and robust as the author claims it to be (e.g., 
Diamond, 1985). Despite a greal deal of ingenuity the trading models, even the 
more elaborate ones with bargaining and money as a medium of exchange, re- 
main rather  abstract.  However,  this  is  not  the  main issue.  The  Walrasian 
model, although more familiar, may not be better in this respect. What is really 
at stake is how markets are functioning. It is the rational expectations equilibri- 
um model, or classical  market approach pioneered by Lucas, which is under 
attack. As Diamond (1984) sees it, search theory is not an alternative for Keyn- 
esian theory. On the contrary, in his view the search approach provides what 
simple  fixed-price  Keynesianism is missing:  a  sound microeconomic founda- 
tion. Long-run relationships, with their informational asymmetries and bar- 
gaining aspects can then be taken into account. Thus search theory can be com- 
plementary to the implicit contract theory or long-term contract theory men- 
tioned in section 1. 
Passing judgement on  the  search-theoretical approach  by Diamond,  two 
points should be born in mind. First, from a  theoretical point of view there 
is great need for theories which do away with the Walrasian auctioneer or his 
likewise unrealistic counterparts. Second, the idea of coordination failures is 
intuitively appealing with respect to an explanation of business cycles or persis- 
tent equilibria with involuntary unemployment. However, it remains to be seen 
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Diamond. In industrial societies  imperfect competition seems  to be the rule 
rather than the exception. Under these circumstances prices  are set by firms 
facing demand curves for their products. As we shall see, externalities leading 
to coordination failure may emerge in models of  monopolistic competition too. 
In our opinion, the latter type of models may be more relevant for understand- 
ing factors that lie behind business cycles  and long waves than Diamond's 
rather abstract analysis of trading processes. 
3 THE ORGANIZATION  OF INDUSTRY 
In Diamond (1982) production of commodities is somewhat archaic. Applying 
the tropical island metaphor the author introduces individuals who are stroll- 
ing along the beaches when employed. They are looking for coconuts to pick 
from the trees. After harvesting workers go searching for trade  nuts for nuts 
-  which will lead to consumption. 
In an industrial society production processes  are more sophisticated and the 
laws of returns must be given proper attention. As observed by Sraffa (1926) 
long ago, everyday experience  shows that a very large number of firms work 
under conditions of increasing returns or diminishing average costs on the 
Marshallian long run. Increasing returns which are internal to the firm may 
be related to indivisibilities  of durable producers' goods, as in Brems (1968). 
Large firms suffer less from the lack of harmony between production and phys- 
ical capacity of durable producers' goods than do small firms.  In this sense 
what is called the Law of HarmonY is an important economy of scale. In addi- 
tion, the Law of Technique expresses  another and clearly distinct economy of 
scale. According to the latter law some techniques are specific for larger plants, 
whereas other techniques may be well-suited for smaller plants. Examples are 
given in Brems (1968, Ch. 10). Increasing returns may also be related to organ- 
isational aspects of modern industry. Organizing production overhead costs, 
which are spread by increasing output, are of conclusive importance. 
As shown by Sraffa (1926), and is nowadays common knowledge, increasing 
returns and perfect competition are not to be reconciled. Or,  as Weitzman 
(1982) puts it even more aptly, increasing returns are the natural enemy of per- 
fect competition and thus the primary cause of imperfect competition. There 
is a  second obstacle to perfect competition, which is of fundamental impor- 
tance. It is the absence of indifference on the part of the buyers of commodities 
regarding the different firms, which can be explained in a number of ways. To 
quote Sraffa (1926, p. 544): 
'The causes of the preference shown by any group of buyers for a par- 
ticular firm are of the most diverse nature, and may range from long 
custom, personal acquaintance, confidence in the quality of the prod- 
uct, proximity, knowledge of particular requirements and the possibil- 
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a means with high traditions, or to such special features of modelling 
or design in the product as -  without constituting it a  distinct com- 
modity intended  for the  satisfaction  of particular  needs -  have for 
their principal purpose that of distinguishing it from the products of 
other firms.' 
Monopolistic competition and increasing returns imply a well-defined market 
equilibrium with interesting features. For our purpose it is worthwhile to con- 
sider the details of that equilibrium.  Preferences as enumerated by Sraffa can 
be modelled  in  several ways.  Here we proceed  by postulating  a  CES  utility 
function  for different  varieties  of a  certain  commodity (e.g.,  Blanchard  and 
Kiyotaki,  1985;  Van de Klundert and Peters,  1987). 1 The choice problem all 
consumers are facing can then be formulated as: 
Max. {co. }  =  7j %(" -  1)/,  , 
j=l 
s.t.  ~  cup u =  clpl, 
)-1 
m 




u: utility index 
c/j: consumption of varietyj of good i 
ci: consumption of composite good i 
p~: price of varietyj of good i 
Pi: price index of composite good i 
m: number of firms (varieties) 
r/: elasticity of substitution between each pair of varieties (~  >  1) 
Consumers choose a bundle of varieties of the composite good i, with prefer- 
ences given according to equation (3.1) and given the prices of these varieties, 
the number of firms (varieties) as well as total expenditure for the composite 
good i (ciPi).  The latter can be found by modelling the consumer's problem as 
a  whole,  i.e.  the  choice  between  composite  commodities  satisfying  different 
wants on the one hand and the choice between varieties of each or most of the 
composites on the other. This problem can be handled conveniently by post- 
ulating  a  nested  CES utility function to characterise the whole set of prefer- 
ences.  However, for our purpose, there is no need to go into such detail.  We 
assume that the  optimal choice between composite commodities has already 
been made. In what follows we therefore skip the index i. 
1  An alternative specification of consumer's preferences which can easily be applied to monopo- 
listic competition is the circular road model (e.g., Varian, 1984; Weitzman, 1982). It can be shown 
that in this model the elasticity of demand evaluated in a symmetric  Nash equilibrium is negatively 
related to the price of the commodity and is positively  related to the number of firms. 474  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
The problem formulated in equations (3.1)  and (3.2) yields the following so- 
lution: 
cj=Ti c  -~1-",  with  (3.3) 
p=IZTjpj"-i  I  (3.4) 
Equation (3.3) is the demand curve firmj is facing, which can be rewritten as: 
pj =  p  (3.5) 
Total revenue can be found by multiplying both sides of (3.5) by 9: 
cjpj =  p(Tjc) 1/'~cj('~  - 1)/,  (3.6) 
Let the cost function of the firm be of the generalized Cobb-Douglas type (e.g., 
Varian, 1984, p. 28) 
..  \a/  ,, fl~l/(a+fl) 
=  (~ +  ~)  7 T  c/l('+ 
where w  1 and w2 denote the given prices of two variable inputs  1 and 2,  and 
where c~ and fl denote the corresponding factor elasticities of the generalized 
Cobb-Douglas production function, and e stands for the general efficiency pa- 
rameter. Increasing returns to scale require c~ +  fl >  1. Combining equations 
(3.6) and (3.7) we get the profit function or pay-off function 
r-,  /  " ~/W  \fl~l/(ot+fl) 
Maximization of 7zj with respect to Cj, ignoring the effect of actions taken on 
the general price level, gives as the optimal volume of output 
I-/r/- 1  \~+~  /  ~ \~/fl \~qn/(~+(~+a){1-~)) 
Cj=[~p)  (~jC)(Ct+fl)/q~l--~I--I  ~',W2,  /  ]  (3.9) 
The second-order condition for a  maximum of r  9 requires  1 +  (ot+fl) 1-_~ >  r/ 
0, as can be easily checked. Consequently, with ~/ >  1 there will be more room 
for increasing returns the less pure competition is, i.e.  the further 1-q will be  r/ 
from  one.  For r/  --*  oo  the  second-order condition will  only be  satisfied if COORDINATION FAILURE IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY  475 
c~ +fl <  1. Profit maximization under perfect competition requires decreasing 
returns, as is well known at least since Marshall. The optimal price to be set 
by the firm can be found by inserting equation (3.9) into equation (3.5).  Alter- 
natively, one should write 
PJ- t/-  1 ~cj  (3.10) 
Prices are determined by a mark-up over marginal cost, which depends on the 
degree of imperfectness of the market. 
If profits, defined in equation (3.8),  are positive new entrants may appear 
on the market and if profits are negative existing firms may close down. Ulti- 
mately, there may result a Chamberlin solution with no firms making positive 
profits. Entry and exist are long-run phenomena. The short run could be typi- 
fied as a situation in which the number of firms is fixed. However, production 
functions with substitutability between factors are usually applied to a  short 
run in which one of the factors is fixed. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion 
we introduce a  different, and perhaps not less realistic, cost function instead 
of equation (3.7).  Following among others Weitzman (1982), Cooper and John 
(1985)  we assume that operating costs are constant and that overhead costs 
consist of a fixed amount. The underlying production function is given by 
1 
cj=--lj-flj,  cj>~0,  (3.11) 
0~j 
where lj  stands for the volume of different inputs used in fixed proportions. 
Denoting by w the given remuneration of this composite factor of production, 
the profit function now reads 
7cj =  p(Tjc)1/"cj("-  1)/,  _  (c~jcj +  c~jflj)w  (3.12) 
Maximization of equation (3.12) under conditions of monopolistic competition 
yields 
q 
PJ -  r/-  1 c~w  (3.13) 
(3.14) 
J 
The optimal price set by firms is proportional to fixed operating costs.  Both 
the optimal price level and the optimal volume of output are independent of 
overhead costs (flw). This highlights the fact that monopolistic competition has 
a  well-defined short-run solution under constant returns to scale. But, as ob- 
served above, this is not a world we consider to be realistic. 476  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
For a subsequent analysis of market equilibrium it is convenient to assume 
complete symmetry between all firms concerned (7i= 7j= 7, ~i = ej= c~, fli=flj=fl 
for every i  #  j). The price set by each firm is then the same and equals the 
general price level according to equation (3.4). The optimal value of output is 
in this case 
cj =  7  c  (3.15) 
Taking account of free entry and exit the long-run market equilibrium condi- 
tion 
cj  /~) 
7zi =  ~w =  0  (3.16) 
r/-1 
provides the optimum value of output in the zero profit situation: 
cj =  (r/-  1)/3  (3.17) 
Combination of equations (3.15) and (3.17) results in the number of firms sup- 
porting the long-run equilibrium. 
m  -  --  (3.18) 
('1  --  1)/3 
The long-run or Chamberlin  solution for the individual firm is illustrated in 
Fig. 2. The optimal price and output quantities are indicated by a star. In the 
optimum situation the average cost curve (AC) is tangent to the demand curve 
or average revenue curve (AR).  At  this level of output marginal  cost (MC) 
equals marginal revenue (MR). Consequently, profits are zero in the long-run 
optimum.  The issue of entry remains a  tricky one and we shall discuss it in 
more detail in the next section. 
4  DEMAND EXTERNALITIES AND COORDINATION 
The model presented in section 3 can be applied on an economy-wide scale if 
one assumes that there are no clearly defined sectors of production, but just 
differentiated products all over the place. Then the model must be closed some- 
how to get a general equilibrium solution. The question therefore is: how can 
c, which is exogenous in a partial equilibrium analysis, be determined endogen- 
ously? As in general equilibrium models only relative prices are explained, the 
nominal wage rate can be fixed. The model does not determine nominal prices. 
To do so would require introduction of money as a  store of value as well as 
a unit of account. COORDINATION FAILURE IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY  477 
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A Walrasian closure of the model is obtained by assuming that all income, i.e. 
income accruing to factors of production including profits, is spent: 
cp  =  Y~  ljw +  ~z~  (4.1) 
j=l  j=l 
Substitution of equations (3.13) and (3.16) in equation (4.1) and taking advan- 
tage of symmetry gives 
l 
c  =  -  -  mfl,  (4.2) 
where l= mli is the total amount of labour employed. As appears from equa- 
tions (4.2) there is a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria within the boun- 
daries defined by the inequalities: q e fl 4  l  ~< P. The first weak inequality fol- 
lows from the condition that profits should be non-negative, while the second 
weak inequality states that labour demand cannot exceed a given labour supply 
(P). It should be observed that the demand for labour does not depend on the 
real wage rate, which follows from equation (3.13).  It is assumed that the real 
wage rate exceeds the marginal disutility of work, which may be constant as 
in Cooper and John (1985).  Under these conditions the labour market does not 478  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
clear. Things are different in the model of Heller (1986).  Real wages are flexible 
and the conditions of demand and supply on the labour market allow for mar- 
ket clearing. There is no involuntary unemployment, but coordination  failure 
translates  into  more underemployment.  A  similar  result  is  reported  by Hart 
(1982) with regard to an extension of his basic model. 
To make sense a  particular  unemployment equilibrium,  which  could come 
into force by accident, must be sustainable. However, a necessary condition for 
sustainability  may be the  zero  profit condition,  because otherwise  new  firms 
may enter and the circular flow will have its way in an upward direction.  This 
is the view strongly supported by Weitzman (1982). Ifr(i =  0 for allj the equali- 
ty between income and expenditure boils down to 
cp =  lw  (4.3) 
Subsitution of equation (3.13) in equation (4.3) results in 
q-ll 
c -  (4.4) 
Again, we have a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria with labour supply 
generating  an  upper  limit.  There  is  no  exact  lower  limit  in  this  case,  but  m 
should of course be large enough to warrant a Nash solution. 
After completing our algebra it may be desirable  to give a  verbal account 
of the Weitzman story. In the short run the number of firms is fixed. Each firm 
makes a  profit or a  loss depending upon the variable and fixed costs it incurs 
and  the  extent  of the  market.  Aggregate  demand  is  also  exogenously fixed. 
Profit maximization of firms then determines output, prices and employment. 
The long-run  situation  allows for entry and exit of firms.  If incumbent firms 
make a profit, new firms will be attracted. In a partial equilibrium analysis with 
total demand given, competition by newcomers will drive profits down to zero. 
There is no reason for this to happen in our general equilibrium model, because 
entrants create their own demand. This is just a nice example of Say's law. To 
obtain the results we look for, i.e. zero profits through competition of newcom- 
ers,  we need  an  additional  assumption,  which  is implicit in  the circular road 
model of monopolistic competition adopted by Weitzman. In the latter model 
the attribute space is represented by a circle with a given circumference. There- 
fore, if the number of firms increases, the distance  in attribute space between 
the products of any two firms decreases and competition is intensified. To get 
a similar result in our model it must be assumed that the elasticity of substitu- 
tion (r/) is a positive function of the number of firms (m).  2 Under this assump- 
tion  profits may go to zero when  new entrants  appear on the market, as ap- 
2  This assumption corresponds to a  property of the circular road model referred to in the pre- 
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pears  from equation  (3.16).  However,  we  should  take  notice  of a  warning 
expressed by Weitzman (1982,  p. 797): 
'The story can only be defined as an approximation. Entry and exit 
are complicated phenomena, involving difficult game theoretic issues 
that defy neat analytic formulation.' 
Which long-run equilibrium the economy attains depends on dynamic specifi- 
cations of the adjustment process, the shocks the system is exposed to and the 
initial conditions. Hysteresis effects are an essential element in stories that can 
be told. 
According to Weitzman a  long-run unemployment equilibrium could not 
exist under constant returns to scale. The unemployed could then easily estab- 
lish firms of their own and Say's law would operate to generate a full employ- 
ment equilibrium. But increasing returns prevent supply from creating its own 
demand because the unemployed cannot go into business without spoiling the 
market through a discrete jump in supply. 
This argument has been challenged vigorously by De  Meza and Perlman 
(1985).  Newcomers will create their own demand and with rational expecta- 
tions, as Weitzman claims to be relevant, nothing will prevent them from enter- 
ing the  market.  There  must  be  other  reasons  for non-entry in  Weitzman's 
model. As such De Meza and Perlman offer two alternatives. The first is that 
positive profits are necessary to induce entry. The second is that entry will not 
occur if potential entrants expect  profits to be negative. The case of positive 
profits as a  requirement for entry does not discriminate between Weitzman's 
model and a standard perfectly competitive model with U-shaped cost curves 
on the firm level and constant returns to scale on the industry level. With per- 
fect competition there can be a long-run equilibrium with unemployment and 
zero profits if prices correspond to minimum average costs. If by assumption 
positive profits are required to induce entry there is nothing to change such 
a situation. 
The  second alternative of De  Meza and  Perlman considers  entry to  take 
place when profits are positive or zero, but assumes that entry will not take 
place if expected profits are negative. As observed above, Say's law operates 
in the model, but newcomers may have mistaken expectations that total de- 
mand is fixed and therefore that entry will spoil the market. Either under mo- 
nopolistic competition or perfect competition with U-shaped cost curves, new 
entrants expect that the demand curve facing them will be lower than the de- 
mand curve of incumbent firms. Thus the potential entrants expect negative 
profits if existing firms have very low or zero profits. 
The discussion of motives for entry obscures the real issue, which is that mo- 
nopolistic competition involves a  demand externality. Profit maximization is 
based on price and quantity signals. The quantities that can be sold depend 
on the output of other firms in the economy. There is the possibility of coordi- 480  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
nation failure just as in the Diamond model with trading externalities. The laws 
of returns have nothing to do with this directly. Also with constant returns to 
scale demand externalities can lead to coordination failure. This point has been 
stressed by Cooper and John (1985) and Heller (1986), who assume a two-sec- 
tor economy to illustrate more clearly what it is all about. Wages and profits 
generated in one sector are spent entirely on commodities of the other sector. 
The number of firms in each industry is fixed and equal to m. Firms behave 
as Nash-Cournot competitors within each sector. 3 
The main result obtained by Cooper and John can be presented in terms of 
the symbols introduced  above.  Making use of the production  function  given 
in equation (3.11), profits of firmj in sector i are by definition: 
n#  =  PiCo.  -  (o~c o  +  fl) w  =  eij(Pi  -  c~w)  --  o~flw 
The demand curve facing sector i is given by 
(4.5) 
P-iC-i 
ci  -  --  (4.6) 
Pl 
Equation (4.6) shows that total expenditure on commodities of sector i equals 
total income in the other sector (symbolized as  -  i) and vice  versa.  The inverse 
of equation (4.6) can be written as 
p-ic-i 
Pi -- --  (4.7) 
x  O. -+- ci,_  j  ' 
where  ci,_j  is the output  of other firms (non-j)  in  sector i,  which  in  a  Nash- 
Cournot game is taken as given, along with price and output in the other sec- 
tor. Maximization of equation (4.5) subject to condition (4.6), assuming com- 
plete symmetry, results in: 
m 
Pi =  aw  (.4.b) 
1  m- 
m-1  1 
(4.9) 
c O  .--  m  2  o~w p-lc-i 
As there is symmetry across sectors we also have 
m 
Pi=  P  i--  .  aw  (4.10)  m  1 
c_  i 
C o- =  =  c _  i,j  (4.11 ) 
m 
3  In the models of Cooper and John (1985) and Heller (1986) firms are conceived as Cournot 
oligopolists in the sense that they take the quantities produced by other firms as given  when making 
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Output in one sector is determined by output in the other sector. The model 
exhibits strategic complementarity. Again, there exists a continuum of equili- 
bria within the boundaries set by the condition of non-negative profits and by 
the condition that labour demand cannot exceed labour supply. The assump- 
tion of decreasing cost is  immaterial  to these  results.  The same conclusions 
hold with ~  =  0.  Heller's model is more sophisticated, but leads basically to 
the same perceptions. The main difference is that Heller obtains multiple, dis- 
crete, Pareto-ranked equilibria instead of a  continuum of equilibria as in the 
other models discussed here. 
When/~  >  0 one may endogenize the number of firms assuming free entry 
(exit). But there is no reason to suppose that entry may go on if profits are 
zero in the Cooper-John model. Newcomers have to share a  given sector de- 
mand with incumbents unless there is a  simultaneous increase in the number 
of firms in the other sector. Coordination failure applies to broad sectors of 
the economy which are interrelated through output and demand. When firms 
in all or many sectors enjoy substantial profits the situation may be ripe for 
a concerted expansion of all sectors. To develop these ideas a natural starting 
point would be the classical article by Allyn Young (1928) on the relation be- 
tween  increasing  returns  and  economic  progress.  However,  this  task  lies 
beyond the scope of the present article. What remains to be done here is to 
show how a  modern view of the labour market fits in a  static or stationary 
framework of coordination failure. 
5 INTERACTIONS  BETWEEN  THE LABOUR MARKET AND THE PRODUCT MARKET 
Search theory applied to the labour market has gone through a number of in- 
teresting developments. Whereas in the older approaches only workers search 
for a job, in more recent studies (e.g.,  Mortensen, 1982; Pissarises,  1986,  1988) 
job matching is the central issue. Firms with a vacancy look for workers who 
are  unemployed  and  want  a  job  and  the  other  way  around  unemployed 
workers search for firms with a vacancy. In these matching models there may 
be externalities, because the chosen intensity of search for trading partners by 
one side of the market affects the optimal intensity of search on the other side 
of the market. As a result unemployment may be inefficiently high. These ob- 
servation may sound familiar after what has been said on the work of Diamond 
in section 2. 
Recently Drazen (1986) has combined the externality mentioned above (type 
l) with a  specific demand  externality (type 2).  This second externality is the 
spillover from demand for commodities to search intensity by firms in the la- 
bour market. Therefore, product market conditions affect the labour market. 
On the other hand labour market conditions affect sales and product market 
equilibrium. In Drazen's model type 2 externality is not very far-reaching. As- 
suming  monopolistic competition in  the  market  for commodites,  along  the 
lines sketched in section 3,  labour demand will be a  function of output sold. 482  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
Demand for commodities will be lower the higher is unemployment. Thus, on 
the assumption that there are no leakages in the system it is straightforward 
to construct a continuum of equilibria. It may nevertheless be instructive to 
examine Drazen's models more closely to show how job matching fits in. 
There is an equal and fixed number of firms and workers. A firm consists 
of a single job, which may be filled or vacant. Technology is kept simple: one 
unit of output is produced by one worker. Firms supply differentiated  products 
but are similar in other respects.  Ultimately, the real wage level is set equal to 
the minimum level required for participation of all workers. Wage determina- 
tion follows from a bilateral monopoly problem, since workers and firms have 
to bargain on the conditions of the contract. In the model real wages are set 
at the minimum level to emphasize that unemployment will not result from 
wages being too high, as may be the case in fixed price models. 
Let £2 be the instantaneous rate of contact between unemployed workers and 
vacant firms. It will also be the rate at which searching workers find employ- 
ment. The rate of contact depends on the intensity of search by both sides of 
the market. Denoting the intensity of search by workers by xl and the recruiting 
intensity of firms by xf we may write 
£2 =  Q(x¢, xl)  (5.1) 
By assumption, equation (5. l) exhibits positive but decreasing marginal returns 
in both xl and xf.  It is further assumed that g2 is zero if one party does not 
search and also that (2 has a finite upper bound if xt and xf become infinitely 
large.  The termination rate of jobs (d) is exogenous. In a stationary state the 
flow into unemployment must equal the flow out of unemployment, which re- 
sults in an equilibrium unemployment rate 
6 
u =  (5.2) 
a +  C~(x~, Xs(X)  ) 
For the time being the intensity of search by workers is assumed constant. It 
can be shown that the optimal recruiting effort by firms depends on sales per 
firm (S).  Labour market equilibrium, as expressed by equation (5.2), thus re- 
lates to the level of sales. 
Product  market  equilibrium  follows  from  profit  maximization  by  firms 
under conditions of monopolistic competition and the equality between sales 
and demand. Profit maximization determines the optimal value of revenue or 
sales (S) via fixed mark-up pricing in line with the analysis in the previous see- 
tion.  4 The number of firms producing will  be  (1-u)m,  where m  is  the  total 
number of firms (and workers). Total sales will then be equal to S(1-u)m. De- 
4  Prices are normalized to one in equilibrium. Since firms produce one unit of output employing 
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noting average consumption of workers by c total demand is cm. In equilibrium 
these two quantities must be equal, yielding 
c 
(5.3)  S-l_  u 
Average consumption must be related to income. Stationary income depends 
on  the  state  of the  firm (filled or vacant)  and  of the  worker  (employed or 
searching for a job). Careful consideration of each possibility leads to four in- 
come streams which can be added to give total income (y). Here we take  a 
short-cut by presenting the final result 
y =  (1  -  u) S--  uh-  ug,  (5.4) 
where h is the amount of search expenditures incurred by workers and g in the 
flow of expenditures on recruiting by firms.  In both cases search costs are a 
convex function of the relevant intensity of search to guarantee optimal solu- 
tions. 
Drazen considers two cases with respect to consumption out of income. The 
first case is where search expenditures h and g are part of the demand for goods 
and where all income (wages and profits) is consumed: 
c  =  y  +  uh +  ug  (5.5) 
Combining equations (5.4) and (5.5) results in 
c =  (1 -  u)S  (5.6) 
From equations (5.3) and (5.6) it now follows that any technologically feasible 
level  of sales  will  reproduce itself via  Say's  law.  However, there  is  a  lower 
bound on S as revenue must be sufficient to allow a value of wages necessary 
to induce labour force participation. The lower bound (_S) on S will therefore 
depend on the (marginal) utility of leisure, which is assumed constant. There 
is a continuum of equilibria all of which must satisfy equation (5.2). This conti- 
nuum of steady states is shown in Fig. 3. 
If S =  1 unemployment is at its minimum level, which depends on the tech- 
nology of search (pure search unemployment). For lower values of S the unem- 
ployment rate  will  be higher,  reflecting both  aggregate  demand  factors and 
search activities. 
The second case considered by Drazen with respect to consumption out of 
income is more complicated, because now 'leakages' from the system are al- 
lowed for. It can then be shown that multiple equilibria may arise. 
Returning to equation (5.1)~t can be argued that type 1 externalities are a 








Figure  3 
above.  If both  workers  and  firms  search  optimally  the  search  intensity  of 
workers will depend on the search intensity of firms and vice versa. The optimal 
recruiting intensity is also a function of sales, as we have seen. Therefore, we 
may write 
x t.(S  ) =  x/(x,(xs), S)  (5.7) 
The value of xf for given S resulting from equation (5.7) need not be unique. 
Consequently, there may be a multiplicity of unemployment rates for a given 
state of aggregate demand. Again, this is an example of the possibility of coor- 
dination failure. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
What is new about modern theories of coordination failure? The principle of 
effective demand has belonged to the core of economic theory since Keynes 
wrote The  General  Theory.  Moreover, Kalecki (1935) already introduced im- 
perfect competition to the microfoundations of macroeconomics in the early 
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that coordination failure may arise in models with complete markets andflex- 
ible, market-clearing prices. The main channel through which this is effectuated 
is the introduction of demand externalities by assuming that monopolistic com- 
petition is the rule rather than the exception. Problems of trade coordination 
and reciprocal search on the labour market give additional support to the view 
of coordination failure, but are in our opinion supplementary. According to 
Kaldor (1983) it is the twin assumptions of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale which lead to a  Walrasian  situation,  in which resources are 
fully utilized and the production of each commodity is at its maximum. 'But 
in the absence of these twin assumptions the mere existence of competition be- 
tween sellers ('firms') will not in itself ensure the full utilization of resources 
unless all firms expand in concert' (ibid., p. 9). 
Despite its intellectual appeal the theory of coordination failure is incom- 
plete in a  number of respects.  Substitution between capital and labour is ig- 
nored, the role of expectations remains somewhat in the background and there 
is no proper analysis of dynamic processes. These critical notes need further 
consideration. 
Coordination failure leads to lower levels of output than would be possible. 
In most models this translates into unemployment, because there are fixed in- 
put coefficients combined with exogenous labour supply (under the condition 
that the real wage rate does not fall short of the marginal disutility of labour). 
The model by Heller (1986) is an exception in the sense that labour supply de- 
pends on the real wage rate. In this case coordination failure translates into 
underemployment instead of unemployment. None of the models discussed as- 
sumes that labour demand is a  negative function of the real wage rate.  One 
could of course argue that there are very limited substitution possibilities in 
the industrial sector of the economy. Another escape is the presumption that 
firms maximize with long-run considerations in mind. But these excuses are not 
very satisfactory. A  more sophisticated theory of coordination failure should 
allow for some substitution between capital and labour and should at the same 
time contain a proper view on the process of wage setting (e.g.,  Cooper, 1986). 
Expectations do matter but are hard to track down. With arbitrary assump- 
tions almost anything can happen.  Rational expectations on the other hand, 
when  taken  literally,  lead  without  failure  to  a  Walrasian  equilibrium.  The 
theory of coordination failure holds a  position between these two extremes. 
Decision-makers in this  theory have only partial  equilibrium knowledge in- 
stead of complete information on the workings of the economy. This may not 
be unrealistic, for as Heller (1986, p. 159) observes: 'It is quite likely that purely 
partial equilibrium knowledge is common when there are many markets inter- 
twined, with Iong and complicated chains of interaction.' 
Finally, there is the question of dynamics. Nice and inspiring stories can be 
told about shocks that propel the economic systems towards an equilibrium 
state with higher or lower employment levels. Hysteresis effects may be brought 
in to suggest that there are fundamental forces in operation. But the real work 486  TH. VAN DE KLUNDERT 
has still to be done.  5 The theory of coordination failure is in need of dynamic 
extensions. Moreover, the question arises  whether, under unchanged circum- 
stances, the Folk Theorem on repeated games can be applied to the models dis- 
cussed in this paper. As observed by Friedman (1986, p. 103) outcomes usually 
associated with cooperation can be supported by noncooperative equilibrium 
strategies if conditions required for the Folk Theorem to be valid are met. 
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Summary 
COORDINATION FAILURE IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
Different macroeconomic theories of coordination failure are dealt with. Using simple models it 
is shown that externalities may lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria or, under suitable as- 
sumptions, to a continuum of equilibria. It is argued that in industrial societies imperfect competi- 
tion is predominant. Therefore, demand externalities may be the main cause of low level equilibria. 
Trading externalities and searching externalities may play a  supplementary role. The theory of 
coordination failure is based on complete markets and price flexibility.  Despite its strong appeal, 
it has certain shortcomings which are also discussed in the paper. 